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Janet McCracken
Dogs anD BirDs in PLaTo
Abstract. arguing for censorship of the poets in the Republic, socrates 
draws most of his examples from Homer. These examples often depict 
soldiers facing death on the battlefield. Homer, in turn, often represents 
a soldier’s death with the image of dogs and birds scavenging upon his 
body. Homer’s representations of death, then, often include dogs or 
birds, and these images are found in the near background of Plato’s 
Republic. How does Plato himself use these animal images? i discuss 
Plato’s depictions of dogs and birds, and characterize his general notion 
of their function in moral education and mental functioning. 
Homer often represents a man’s death with the image of dogs and birds scavenging upon his body. For instance: “rage—goddess, 
sing the rage of Peleus’ son achilles, / murderous, doomed, that cost 
the achaeans countless losses, / . . . [and] made their bodies carrion, 
/ feast for the dogs and birds . . . ” (Iliad 1.1–5).1 in Iliad Book Xi, for 
example, a soldier’s death is represented with this image four times. 
similarly, the achaeans fought like hunting dogs, or the Trojans like 
vultures. in such passages, dogs and birds are the recipients of a kind 
of earthly sacrifice, the lowly material counterparts to Hades’s spiritual 
function. similar parallels between dogs’ and birds’ custodial roles over 
the bodies of the dead and the gods’ custody over their souls appear 
in many places in the Iliad. in socrates’s arguments for censorship of 
the poets in Books ii and iii of Plato’s Republic, the vast majority of 
examples are drawn from Homer, particularly those depicting someone 
facing death on the battlefield, which relate to education in courage. 
Homer’s representations of death, therefore—which surprisingly often 
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include references to dogs or birds—are in the near background of 
Plato’s discussion of moral education in the Republic.
it is a small wonder, then, that the figures of dogs and birds themselves 
appear in the Platonic dialogues as examples of moral education and 
as objects of moral deliberation. Here, i will lay out Plato’s use of these 
figures, and characterize Plato’s general notion of their function in moral 
education and reflection. in addition, i will make some remarks about 
how these figures might be usefully extrapolated to our understanding 
of dogs and birds independent of their role in ancient texts.
I
For some readers, the Homeric image of dogs and birds may be 
just a way to poeticize the depictions of death that Homer’s story lines 
require him to make, depictions that would otherwise be repetitive and 
undramatic. Perhaps some readers simply take Homer to be availing 
himself of an established idiom. Perhaps the image evokes the futility 
of war—all that comes of it, Homer seems to say, are fat dogs and birds. 
i believe, however, that the image also represents an essential human 
condition—the condition of openness to moral education, a condition 
that Plato calls “ridiculousness.” indeed, Homer’s characters also seem 
to recognize this aspect of the image, using references to dogs and 
birds to ridicule their enemies, as when Hector tells ajax, “if you have 
the daring to stand up against my spear . . . / You’ll glut the dogs and 
birds of Troy / with your fat and flesh” (Iliad 13.960). The image of 
dogs and birds feasting upon the bodies of one’s enemies or comrades 
can inspire rage, embarrassment, pride, shame, fear, pity, disdain, and 
humiliation. Homer uses it to achieve all of these effects. The image 
evokes a kind of excruciating tragicomedy that incites or deflates cour-
age, the paradigmatic greek virtue and the most important lesson in 
the education of the guardians in Plato’s Republic.
in general, Plato’s references to animals are ridiculous in a way similar 
to Hector’s taunting of ajax. These figures provoke interlocutors and 
readers alike to test their mettle by bringing a humble—if not humiliat-
ing—element into their high-falutin’ philosophical conversation. They 
do not have the high drama of oratory, to which socrates continually 
contrasts philosophy; they are small and bittersweet. Plato uses them in 
something more than a purely rhetorical way, however: there is some-
thing unsettling about how seriously he takes his discussions of horse 
training, sheepherding, and other apparent fluff, something provocative 
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about the tragedy he can bring out of a comic element. strange yet 
constant companions to the abstract arguments of the dialogues, Plato’s 
references to our furry and feathered friends seem a little ridiculous, a 
little unnecessary—and they have tended to get a benign but unserious 
reception from philosophers.
at least some of the references to animals that appear in the Platonic 
dialogues ought to be taken seriously, however, because they represent 
models for education. Much of the Republic is taken up with issues in 
moral education, and much of it with how literary figures affect read-
ers’ moral knowledge. one can expect this dialogue, then, to take a 
certain responsibility for its use of animal imagery, to provide an intro-
duction to its own analysis as literature. i believe the closing allegory, 
the eschatological myth of Er, provides such an introduction. socrates 
summarizes the myth: “souls changed from animals into human beings, 
or from one kind of animal into another [for their next incarnation], 
with unjust people changing into wild animals, and just people into 
tame ones” (Republic 620d).2 
The passage indicates that animals will be used in the Republic to 
represent choices of lives. in particular, i will argue, dogs model a philo-
sophical, or “ridiculous,” or “dialogic” life. Plato considers the dog to be 
a paradigmatically tame animal, representing, as the Er myth indicates, a 
just person. Various birds, i will show, model a tragic life for Plato, and 
they help interlocutors and readers understand both why the choice 
of a tragic life seems attractive, and why it really is not so. Plato figures 
the bird as a particularly attractive kind of wild, or unjust, life. This is 
because the bird, on account of its tragic beauty, makes a certain kind 
of cowardice seem like freedom and nobility.
as the opening lines of the Iliad remind us, dogs and birds are scav-
engers. as scavengers, dogs and birds are the liaisons between the old, 
cast-off bodies of the dead, and the new bodies of the living—the dogs’ 
and birds’ own bodies. Dogs and birds, in their role as scavengers, assist 
in the transformation of bodies from death to life. in the Meno and the 
Phaedo, socrates founds the theory of reincarnation upon this transfor-
mation. in several dialogues, particularly the Gorgias and the Republic, 
socrates draws explicit analogies between the crafts responsible for the 
care of the body and those responsible for the care of the soul. The 
most obvious of these is the repeated analogy between the practice of 
medicine and the practice of philosophy. 
The theory of recollection in the Meno, the theory of love and learn-
ing in the Symposium, and the theory of education in the Republic all 
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rely upon this same analogy—that the transformation a body goes 
through in reincarnation (or other kinds of bodily renewal) is akin to 
the transformation that a soul goes through in education. The soul, 
like the body, is depicted as experiencing a kind of “rebirth” through 
the mediation of a chosen or beloved object. This is analogous to the 
transformation that bodies undergo after death, through the mediation 
of dogs and birds. it should not be surprising, then, that Plato, sensi-
tive to Homeric imagery and a believer in the immortality of the soul, 
uses dogs and birds as metaphors for those through whose influences 
a soul is “reborn.”
a passage from socrates’s speech in the Symposium makes this anal-
ogy perfectly explicit. “a person is said to be the same from childhood 
till he turns into an old man—even then he never consists of the same 
things . . . but he is always being renewed and in other respects passing 
away, in his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his entire body. 
and it’s not just in his body, but in his soul, too, for none of his man-
ners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, or fears ever remains 
the same, but some are coming to be in him while others are passing 
away” (Symposium 207d).3 He calls the changes that affect a soul “learn-
ing” and “forgetting.” These affect a kind of reincarnation even during 
this life. Diotima quite explicitly includes literary figures among the 
objects of love that occasion these transformative educational experi-
ences. “Everyone would rather have such children [i.e., poetic ideas] 
than human ones, and would look up to Homer, Hesiod, and the other 
good poets with envy and admiration for the offspring they have left 
behind” (Symposium 209d).
Even as he argues in Book ii of the Republic for censorship of the 
poets, socrates states that “there is some truth in them” (Republic 377a), 
indicating that poetic images may have a value in education despite 
his present criticisms. He follows this up in Book X by reintroducing 
poetry to the just city, if it “has any argument to bring forward” (Republic 
607b). Plato certainly lends evidence for the claim that literary figures 
can lead to knowledge by providing throughout the dialogues so many 
myths, images, and examples, and so many verbatim passages from the 
very poets that socrates criticizes.
Thus, literary figures like dogs and birds not only help put across a 
variety of philosophical claims within the dialogues but also reveal certain 
strains of Platonic epistemology and link it in a meaningful way to his 
theory of education. By studying such images in depth, one can glean 
Platonic theories about how a particular person’s character affects her 
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ability to retain knowledge. This is a particularly useful way to investigate 
the Republic, because Plato’s most detailed and straightforward theory 
of education appears in that dialogue. so let’s consider a very extended 
image from the Republic, one that is put forward by socrates explicitly 
to characterize the good philosophy student: the puppy.
II
The key to the creation of the ideal city is that “philosophers rule as 
kings, or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely 
and adequately philosophize” (Republic 473d). in Book ii, regarding 
the censorship of texts in the education of the guards, socrates lands 
upon a figure that will direct the guards’ attention to this “genuine and 
adequate” study of philosophy—dogs. “Tell me, glaucon: i see that you 
have hunting dogs and quite a flock of noble fighting birds at home. 
Have you noticed anything about their mating and breeding? . . . if 
this also holds true for human beings, our need for excellent rulers is 
indeed extreme” (Republic 459a–c). Before they are educated, socrates 
claims, the potential guards are like good dogs: quick on the uptake, fast 
in their pursuit of knowledge, strong, and gentle (Republic 375a-c), but 
they are not yet courageous, obedient to their city, and protective of it. 
The best guardians are lucky enough to be very much like dogs by 
innate temperament. Like dogs, however, their increasing mastery of 
guardianship and their potential for good rulership depends on their 
being well “trained.” Through education, or “training,” the guardians 
must turn their innate gentleness into loyalty, and their innate aggressive-
ness into courage. The “puppy” passage is quite ridiculous, and we are 
therefore compelled, i believe, to take it both seriously and sarcastically. 
“surely [the guards] must be gentle to their own people, and harsh for 
the enemy. if they aren’t, they won’t wait around for others to destroy 
the city but will do it themselves first . . . / You know, of course, that a 
pedigree dog naturally has a character of this sort—he is gentle as can 
be to those he is used to and knows, but the opposite to those he doesn’t 
know . . . / When a dog sees someone it doesn’t know, it gets angry, . . . 
but when it knows someone, it welcomes him even if it has never 
received anything good from him. . . . / surely this is a refined quality 
in its nature and one that is truly philosophical” (Republic 375c–376b).
The potential guardian is the lover and the fighter conjoined, loving 
what it knows (it loves knowledge) and angry at what it does not know 
(it becomes angry at ignorance). socrates depicts these canine traits as 
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explicitly philosophical. in this passage, socrates glosses these philo-
sophical qualities primarily in terms of dogs’ loyalty—a dog is gentle 
to her own people and aggressive to strangers. The dog, then, models 
a philosophical disposition for a particular kind of philosophy student, 
one who has civic, military, or political aspirations, like the guards in 
the republic, or like glaucon and adeimantus, or even very like those 
students who would be reading the Republic in a college political science 
or philosophy class today.
The character of the dog is particularly well suited to inspire good 
guardians, precisely because it has the apparently contradictory nature 
that i have called “ridiculous.” a dog willingly loves and willingly fights, 
she is gentle and fierce, and she correctly recognizes both her friends 
and enemies (represented in the philosophical context as knowledge 
and ignorance, respectively). a dog is not easily embarrassed, making 
mistakes boldly and correcting them diligently, without a worry about 
their reflection upon her status or reputation. a dog is completely 
devoted to her friends and on that account frightening in her hatred 
of her enemies.
The dog continues to be a model for students, according to socrates, 
on into the period of physical training. “our warrior-athletes,” he argues 
in Book iii (404a–c), “need a more sophisticated kind of training [than 
the present regimen for athletes]. They must be like sleepless hounds, 
able to see and hear as keenly as possible, and to endure frequent changes 
of drinking water and food, as well as summer and winter weather . . . ” 
socrates adds to this claim, oddly enough, that “you might learn about 
such things from Homer . . . ” This is a somewhat odd set of claims all 
around, for a dog’s good hearing and eyesight are natural, not trained, 
qualities, nor are these qualities very likely to result from the gymnastic 
or dietary regimens that are outlined for the warrior-athletes in the rest 
of the passage. The point of the passage seems simply that the warrior-
athletes’ bodies and appetites, like their spirits, should be like dogs’. 
in fact, in Book iV the dog becomes a simple figure for the “spirited,” 
or emotional, part of the human soul (Republic 440d). 
another discussion of dogs as models for military (and in this case, also 
moral) trainees is followed immediately by a somewhat abrupt reference 
to Homer, in Book iV, at 440d–441c: “we made the auxiliaries in our city 
like dogs obedient to their rulers, who are themselves like shepherds of 
a city . . . Besides, our earlier quotation from Homer bears it out, where 
he says, ‘He struck his chest and spoke to his heart.’” The Homeric reference 
here is to a passage of the Odyssey (XX.17)4 in which odysseus, having 
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returned to ithaca, has to struggle against his desire to kill Penelope’s 
suitors outright. Homer describes odysseus’s posture in this spiritual 
struggle as “like a bitch mounting over her weak, defenseless puppies / 
growls, facing a stranger, bristling for a showdown,” like a dog protect-
ing its own. note that Plato uses this provocative and dramatic poetic 
image unmediated by censors. 
indeed, when, in Book X, socrates, glaucon, and adeimantus return 
to the discussion of poetry, suggesting that they might have been too 
harsh in their earlier criticisms, socrates returns to the image of the 
dog, saying, “Let’s also tell poetry that there is an ancient quarrel 
between it and philosophy, which is evidenced by such expressions as 
‘the dog yelping and shrieking at its master’ . . . nonetheless, . . . if the 
poetry . . . has any argument to bring forward that proves it ought to 
have a place in a well-governed city, [we] at least would be glad to admit 
it” (607b–c). This is a tellingly ambiguous phrasing: the dog could as 
easily be representing poetry as philosophy, echoed in the image of a 
personified poetry “arguing” for its position. 
Plato deliberately conflates the dog as poetic image with the dog as 
philosophical example. This is because of dogs’ unique role in literature 
and nature as both scavengers and loyal protectors. Dogs face death in a 
noble and workaday fashion, while nonetheless protecting life selflessly; 
they maintain precisely the delicate position of the philosopher that 
socrates is at pains to defend in the Phaedo: “that it is not right to do 
oneself violence, and yet that the philosopher will be willing to follow 
one who is dying . . . ” (61d).5 it may be of note that socrates’s remark 
follows immediately after he reveals that he has taken up writing poetry 
in the last days of his life (61a–c). 
socrates’s remarks here evoke odysseus’s dog, argos. noble, devoted, 
and perceptive even in extreme old age and ignominious circumstances, 
argos, alone in ithaca, recognizes his master, outstripping even Penelope 
and Laertes. and yet, like socrates’s “true” philosopher, he knows when it 
is his time to die. odysseus enters his palace in disguise. There, “infested 
with ticks, half-dead from neglect / . . . lay the hound, old argos. / But 
the moment he sensed odysseus standing by / he thumped his tail . . . / 
the dark shadow of death closed down on argos’ eyes / the instant he 
saw odysseus, twenty years away” (Odyssey XVii.318–60).
argos does not face his death with a tragic spectacle. Like the choices 
made by the souls in the myth of Er, argos on his dunghill is “pitiful 
[and] funny” (Republic 620a). instead of arrogantly clinging to life or 
self-indulgently tossing life away, he demonstrates a tempered willingness 
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to die. These characteristics are precisely those that socrates exemplifies 
in the Crito, sitting in his prison cell, waiting to be executed under the 
law. offered a way to escape prison and avoid his execution, socrates, 
like argos, will not run away from his home just because he has been 
mistreated there. He obeys the laws as argos does odysseus, “hearing” 
them tell him to be “persuaded by us who have brought you up” (Crito, 
54b).6
The proper obligation of the good citizen toward her city, then, is 
like a dog’s relationship to her household and master. The dog does not 
choose her household, but does not consider herself free to abandon 
her household just because she does not agree with her treatment there. 
The dog’s devotion, like the patriotism of the good citizen, is neither 
unconditional nor coerced. she does not submit her will to that of her 
master; rather, she is willing, in a tempered way, to remain with her 
master despite clashing with her master’s will. This is also, clearly, a good 
model for a philosophical education. Teachers and students must prevail 
in their endeavor despite unavoidable disagreements between them, 
and students must feel that their study is uncoerced if their education 
is to meet with success. Through a dogged determination to study, in 
the face of possible humiliations on both sides, education occurs. in a 
community without this sense of duty, states socrates, “a teacher . . . is 
afraid of his students and flatters them, while the students despise their 
teachers . . . ” in such a city, socrates claims, “as the proverb says, dogs 
become like their mistresses . . . ” (Republic 563a–c).
Thus, the dog represents a “ridiculous” character in Plato, whose 
tragicomic spirit gives rise to the tempered willingness to die that we call 
“courage.” as such, the dog can teach us courage even in an age when 
such teachers are hard to find among human beings. socrates indicates 
the universality of the dog’s appeal when he asks adeimantus, “Do you 
think that anyone . . . would choose to fight hard, lean dogs, rather 
than to join them in fighting fat and tender sheep?” (Republic 422d).
III
in the myth of Er (Republic 614b–621d), the choice of a tame reincar-
nation is favorably contrasted to the choice of a wild one. Plato figures 
the wild or unvirtuous life as a bird’s life, and he quite explicitly depicts 
the choice to live as a bird as a tragic choice: 
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Er . . . said that he saw the soul which had once belonged to orpheus 
choosing a swan’s life, because he hated the female sex because of his 
death at their hands . . . [He] saw the soul of Thamyris choosing the life 
of a nightingale, a swan choosing to change over to a human life, and 
other musical animals doing the same thing. . . . [agamemnon’s] sufferings 
also had made him hate the human race, so he changed to the life of an 
eagle. . . . still other souls changed from animals into human beings, or 
from one kind of animal into another, with unjust people changing into 
wild animals, and just people into tame ones, and all sorts of mixtures 
occurred. (620a–d)
The first twenty or so souls in the underworld—poets, singers, and 
tragic heroes—chose birds’ lives, and songbirds chose human lives. 
Circumstance made orpheus, a great lover and singer, hate women 
instead of ignorance, or so it is implied, and he chose to live as a swan. 
Thamyris, also a great poet and singer, suffered wounded pride at the 
hands of the Muses, and he chose to live as a nightingale. in orpheus 
and Thamyris, the choice to be reborn as a bird stems from a tragic 
character, the result of a life of seemingly unjustified misfortunes. its 
tragedy, furthermore, is depicted in them as particularly appealing to the 
soul of an artist, someone dependent, according to Plato, upon divine 
inspiration. The metaphorical “scavenging” of the songbird upon the 
artist is represented here as a plea for artistic justice on the artist’s part, 
almost like a prayer to the Muses for inspiration.
The misfortune that befalls such a person appears to her as aban-
donment or even cruelty at the hands of the gods. she does not blame 
herself for her unhappiness. rather, she attributes her tragic failure, in 
the first instance, to others—in orpheus’s case, to women, in Thamyris’s 
case, to the Muses. The chooser of birds, on the educational metaphor, 
does not interpret the humiliation that education entails as the natural 
result of her own mistakes, but rather as an exercise of raw power on 
the part of her masters. such a person feels like a mistreated slave, one 
who, like the beaten, badly trained animals mentioned in Book iii at 
416a, goes wild, “like wolves instead of dogs.”
insofar as the musical birds in the Er myth are—extrapolating upon 
the swan—described as choosing human reincarnations, the choices of 
orpheus and Thamyris are characterized as part of a tragic cycle. indeed, 
the implication of the myth is that tragedy, at least for the soul of an 
artist, is cyclical. The envious musical birds apparently chose human 
lives because their lives as birds (much envied by human singers) did 
not provide the satisfactions they had hoped for when they chose life 
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as a bird the last time around. Plato depicts artistic expression and the 
music of birds as inadequate to the desires that motivate them, and, 
because they are inadequate, they are repetitively abandoned. But 
they are also repetitively chosen, indicating that they appear eternally 
attractive to a lover of artistic expression. a bird’s life seems pure from 
the standpoint of an artist, a life of free expression and natural beauty. 
Disappointment with the constraints of life and the envy of those whose 
lives seem unconstrained go hand in hand here, and this envy and 
disappointment play themselves out in this myth in a perpetual tragic 
interchange between artists and musical birds.
The closing reincarnation myths of the Phaedo and Republic both 
verify that the philosophical life leads to a more stable reincarnation 
than do other lives. “Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by 
philosophy,” socrates states in the Phaedo, “live in the future altogether 
without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling 
places” than the surface of the earth (Phaedo 114c). He describes Er as 
reporting, “There was an interchange of goods and evils for most of the 
souls. However, if someone pursues philosophy in a sound manner when 
he comes to live here on earth . . . it looks as though not only will he 
be happy here, but his journey from here to there and back again won’t 
be along the rough underground path, but along the smooth heavenly 
one” (619d–e). socrates indicates in both myths that the philosopher’s 
choice will distinguish itself from the repetitive, cyclical interchange 
of goods and evils that afflicts the choices of other lives, and that the 
philosophical rebirth is “smooth” and “happy”—not tragic. The tragic 
choices of orpheus, Thamyris, and the musical birds, in contrast, it is 
implied, will repeat themselves at the next opportunity, unless a philo-
sophical education intercedes on their behalf.
The representation of the tragic love of swans and nightingales that 
appears in the Phaedo echoes these implications of the myth of Er. 
There, socrates describes the interpreter of birds as cowardly, with a 
tendency to make a tragic situation out of a happy one. When, he states, 
swans “realize that they must die they sing most and most beautifully, as 
they rejoice that they are about to depart to join the god whose servants 
they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, tell lies about 
the swans and say that they lament their death and sing in sorrow. They 
do not reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or suffers in 
any other way, neither the nightingale nor the swallow nor the hoopoe” 
(Phaedo 84e–85a).
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agamemnon, the twenty-first soul in the myth of Er, chooses an eagle’s 
life, because his “sufferings also had made him hate the human race” 
(Republic 620b). again, the choice to live one’s next life as a bird repre-
sents human disappointment and envy. Where orpheus and Thamyris 
resented having been done out of the rewards they believed were owed 
to their talent, however, agamemnon has, according to his lights, been 
done out of the rewards due his position. He has a moral and political 
complaint with human life, not an aesthetic one. His situation, as he 
understands it, parallels that of “the just man, who is simple and noble, 
. . . as aeschylus says” (Republic 361b–c). The reference to aeschylus indi-
cates that Plato takes this character’s situation to be tragic. agamemnon 
and the eagle in the myth of Er, then, are apparently also involved in 
a kind of tragic interchange, but theirs evokes the debate in political 
philosophy that is the Republic’s fundamental theme.
outraged by the seeming unfairness of his treatment in life, being 
vanquished by an inferior, agamemnon envies the eagle’s power and free-
dom. and, like orpheus and Thamyris, agamemnon does not acknowl-
edge his own part in the tragedy of his life; he blames Clytaemnestra. 
Homer depicts the ghost of agamemnon in the underworld similarly, 
appalled even in death by the apparent injustice of his rewards in life 
(Odyssey Xi.484–7). Homer evokes this imagery also in the Iliad, where 
he describes agamemnon’s Trojan victims, ironically, as “craved far more 
by the vultures than by wives” (Iliad i.189). in his choice of an eagle’s 
life, Plato’s agamemnon parallels Homer’s; he is arrogant in death as 
he was in life, still seeking the glory he believes is his due, instead of 
accepting with nobility the reward that is the just due of every individual. 
Thus, even the tragic heroism of the great agamemnon comes across 
in the Er myth as a kind of cowardice.
The decision to live as a bird is depicted in all of these cases as a 
wild choice, a choice to live, in a sense, like a wild animal. Er explicitly 
describes this kind of choice as unjust. Yet since, according to socrates, 
one would never choose willingly this patently unjust life, knowing it to 
be unjust, we must understand these tragic lives to be motivated by a 
kind of ignorance that makes such a choice, falsely, seem rational and 
good. Plato represents the motivation for the choice of a bird’s life as 
a kind of disgust with the tame domestic life of civil obedience that 
is natural for the dog and good for the guardians of the ideal city. it 
grows out of a sort of arrogant cowardice—fear and disdain of every 
mortal’s lot: death. The lovers of birds are afraid of the lowliness of 
death, afraid to lose, finally and without recourse, their status, their 
reputation, their power.
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Flight, with all its cowardly connotations, is even more of an essen-
tial characteristic of birds than predation or singing. in loving birds, 
on account of this truly superhuman ability, one loves something lofty, 
beautiful, and apparently free. of all the animals, birds seem closest to 
the gods. By choosing to live as birds, the tragic characters in the myth 
of Er try to escape all the lowly, slavish aspects of human life—and death. 
The lover of birds, narcissistic and arrogant, wants to be looked up at. 
But birds, inevitably, are beyond human reach. Life among their ranks 
can never satisfy human desires. Hence, life as a bird will never redress 
the tragic character’s disappointments with human life. Life as a bird 
does not satisfy the desires that motivated it; it can never, in a sense, 
be high enough to reach the standards of the arrogant character that 
chooses it. Because life as a bird ends in a disappointment comparable 
to that of the bird lover, the bird will choose again as it did before—to 
live as an artist or ruler, closer to the gods even than she, she will imag-
ine, because of their humanity.
Even in death, then, orpheus, Thamyris, and agamemnon are trying 
to escape death. in this way, Plato indicates, arrogance will always be 
a masquerade for cowardice. Cowardice, in its turn, is just that variety 
of ignorance in which one believes one’s own life deserves a better 
treatment than that of others, a better treatment than—one ought to 
know—it will inevitably receive. The tragic cycle represented by Plato 
in the love of birds is an unending interchange between cowardice and 
arrogance. The past incarnations of birds love their own mortal lives 
too much to give them up, and so, they will never accept—as philoso-
phers do, according to socrates—the end of that mortal cycle to which 
embodiment leads.
in the political terms so important to the Republic, the choice of 
a bird’s life indicates a soul that loves freedom more than justice. it 
expresses the ideal of freedom that leads a government to make demo-
cratic reforms. it should not be a surprise, then, that the tragedy of 
bird loving in the myth of Er recalls socrates’s criticisms of democracy 
in Book Viii. “What about the animals? are we, with aeschylus, going 
to ‘say whatever it was that came to our lips just now’ about them? — 
‘Certainly. i put it this way: no one who hasn’t experienced it would 
believe how much freer domestic animals are in a democratic city than 
anywhere else” (563c). This somewhat abrupt reference to aeschylus 
indicates the tragic character of Plato’s “democratic man.” and socrates 
describes the democratic man in birdlike terms. He flies hither and 
thither without discipline, “yielding day by day to the desire at hand” 
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(561c). He is shameless (562e), immoderate (561d), insatiable in his 
desires (562b); and his beliefs, personified by socrates and like spiritual 
scavengers, “rush up and occupy” (560c) his soul.
Just like the man who chooses to be reborn as a bird, however, the 
democratic man, according to socrates, becomes enslaved by his insa-
tiable desire for freedom. socrates describes the tyranny into which 
democracy falls in exactly the cyclical terms in which he describes tragic 
reincarnation in the myth of Er: “Excessive action in one direction 
usually sets up a reaction in the opposite direction. This happens in 
seasons, in plants, in bodies, and, last but not least, in constitutions. . . . 
so extreme freedom [changes] to extreme slavery” (563e–64a). Because 
the immoderate and unreasonable desire for freedom is motivated by 
a hatred of slavery, tyrannies, Plato implies, are inevitably overthrown 
by democratic insurgents, and democracies are invariably susceptible 
to tyrants.
IV
For the ancient greeks reading the Platonic dialogues, birds were 
signs; vehicles for divination. Plato certainly has this in mind whenever 
he uses the figures of birds. in the Phaedo, he represents socrates, in his 
last moments, as a champion of bird reading. “i believe myself to be a 
fellow servant with the swans and dedicated to the same god” (Phaedo 
85b). The tragic character who chooses life as a bird is, in a sense, a 
disappointed prospective prophet. she envisions knowledge as fortune 
telling; she wants more to prevail than to know. socrates, in granting the 
birds their prophetic function, grants to the tragic character the verity 
of the divine inspiration for which she hopes. Like the prophetic birds, 
however, divine inspiration passes over one at its own will—it cannot 
be conquered by a human being, cannot be, as socrates warned Meno, 
“tied down” (Meno 97e)7: hence the need for philosophy.
a useful understanding of Platonic figures of birds as signs or diviners 
can be derived from the extended metaphor of the aviary that socrates 
puts forward in the Theaetetus (197c–200c)8 as a possible model for the 
mind. Theaetetus and socrates do not, ultimately, accept this image as 
a representation of knowledge (200b–c). nonetheless, Plato gives us the 
aviary, as false, to reflect upon when we read the Theaetetus. Perhaps, by 
recognizing falsehood, we can learn to distinguish truth from it. The 
aviary depicts a wrongheaded way of thinking about knowledge, a way 
in which one envisions one’s ideas as birds. 
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The aviary illustrates the particular sort of ignorance under whose 
constraints the lover of birds suffers, ignorance very much like a frus-
trated diviner’s naive dependence on birds. socrates sets up the meta-
phor as follows: 
 . . . by the birds we must understand pieces of knowledge. When any-
one takes possession of a piece of knowledge and shuts it up in the pen, 
we should say that he has learned or has found out the thing of which 
this is the knowledge . . . But [a person] may yet make a false judgment 
about it . . . because it is possible for him to “have,” not the knowledge 
of this thing, but another piece of knowledge instead. When he is hunt-
ing for one piece of knowledge, it may happen, as they fly about, that he 
makes a mistake . . . as you might catch a ring-dove instead of a pigeon. 
(Theaetetus 197d–199b) 
The image is unsatisfactory, according to socrates, because “it fol-
lows that a man who has knowledge of something is ignorant of this 
very thing not through want of knowledge but actually in virtue of his 
knowledge . . . But presumably he will not think he is judging falsely” 
(Theaetetus 199d–200a). The mistaken individual socrates describes 
here makes the same kind of tragic choice as orpheus, Thamyris, and 
agamemnon in the myth of Er. Because her “hunt” for knowledge is 
unguided and untamed, she chooses, in a sense, whatever idea seems 
good to her—which is tantamount to choosing an idea according to 
her desires, choosing what she pleases. 
This choice, then, is “in virtue of her knowledge,” because all the ideas 
she has to choose from are things she knows (at least according to the 
hypothesis), and because she desires knowledge; but it is a mistaken 
choice nonetheless, because her desire is not to make the correct choice 
for its own sake, but to conquer a situation. and since she makes a false 
judgment, her choice will not satisfy the demands she makes of it—it 
will not, for instance, correctly answer the question she has been posed, 
nor therefore will it position her well in a conversation. not thinking 
that she has judged falsely, she will not attribute this disappointment 
to herself, but to the questioner or the person who tries to correct her 
mistake. and because she has not properly attributed the cause of her 
mistake, she cannot guarantee that she will not make it again.
The use of birds to put across this particular—and according to 
socrates, failed—model of knowledge is essential to its mechanics. Birds 
fly around, even when they are caught in a cage, and the model does 
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not function without this quality of birds. Birds are essential, in addition, 
to that part of the model that is successful, just as they are to that part 
which is disappointing. The aviary does model how one might forget 
something that one has learned, and answer a question wrongly even 
though one has been taught the answer, both of which mistakes often 
occur, and require epistemological explanation. 
The essential utility of the birds in “the aviary” can be understood 
by trying to work the analogy with another kind of animal—say, for 
instance, dogs. First of all, in that first moment of learning in which 
one originally gathers the animals into a pen to hold for a subsequent 
occasion, no hunting would be needed with dogs. They would as likely 
as not follow one into the pen—certainly so if one offered them food as 
a persuasive tactic. in the second moment, when one tries to recall what 
one has learned, one would simply call the dog that one needed. Even 
if one mixed dogs and birds in the cage, the second moment, recalling 
what one has learned, would be easier, because the dogs would assist 
the thinker in her search for the birds, as hunting dogs do.
This ridiculous spin on the Theaetetus aviary is not just a lark. it 
demonstrates that different epistemological stances can be usefully 
represented through the figures of animals. in particular, this read-
ing of the aviary shows that on a Platonic model, the person who has 
a tragic, romantic, notion of ideas, the person who imagines ideas to 
be lofty and free, will make mistakes more easily than the person who 
imagines her ideas as tame, workaday animals—as friends. The “friend of 
wisdom,” the philosopher, imagines ideas as dogs; thereby she imagines 
wisdom to reciprocate her friendship. Wisdom the dog is a trustworthy 
coworker in her hunt for the truth, eternally there when she needs it. 
With Wisdom at her side, all she needs to do is call ideas by the right 
name, and they will come to her assistance.
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